Notes - MCS
Secure Execution Environments
Notes - MCS
Secure Execution Environments
  • Secure Execution Environments
  • Introduction
    • Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
    • TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)
    • Can you trust the operating system?
  • Security in Operating Systems
    • Operating system
    • Virtual machines and hypervisors
    • Computational model
    • Access control
    • Protection with capabilities
    • Unix file protection ACLs
    • Windows NTFS file protection
    • Unix file protection ACLs
    • Privilege elevation
    • Privilege reduction
    • Linux login
  • Virtualization on Intel Processors
    • Modes of Operation
    • Virtual memory
    • How to put assembly instructions inside C code
    • A more elaborate example
    • Useful assembly instructions
  • Intel Software Guard Extensions
    • What is SGX (Software Guard eXtensions)?
    • SGX Enclave Memory
    • Guidelines for designing applications using SGX
    • Performance Overhead
    • SDK compilation modes
    • Writing Enclave Functions
  • ARM TrustZone
    • SoC and IP
    • ARM TrustZone
    • Worlds
    • Architecture
    • TrustZone bootstrap
  • Linux Kernel Namespaces
    • Namespaces
    • Advantages
    • Process Namespace
    • Network namespace
    • Mount namespace
    • UTS namespace
    • User namespace
  • LXC Linux Containers
    • Container
    • LXC containers
  • AppArmor
    • Purpose
    • Enforcement
    • Benefits
    • Attack prevention
    • Enforcement policies
    • Enforcement modes
    • Logging and auditing
    • Profiles
  • TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
    • Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
    • History
    • Cryptographic Concepts
    • Use cases
    • TPM Software Stack (TSS)
    • TPM concepts
    • Entities
    • Key management
    • Restrict signatures
    • Sessions
    • Authorization roles
  • Bootstrap security
    • AEGIS
    • Trusted computing
    • Root of Trust Measurements
    • Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)
    • TPM-based attestation
    • Trusted Platform identity credentials
    • UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface)
    • NSA Boot Security
    • UEFI secure boot & TPM measurements
    • Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
    • Smartcards
      • Java Cards
      • OpenCard Framework (OCF)
      • Cryptographic services
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  • Goal
  • Approach
  • AEGIS secure boot process guaranty
  • Boot process
  1. Bootstrap security

AEGIS

Assuming that host hardware is valid, the integrity of a higher layer can be guaranteed if

  • The integrity of the lower layers is checked.

  • Transitions to higher layers occur only after integrity checks on them are complete.

The resulting integrity “chain” inductively guarantees system integrity.

Goal

Without a secure bootstrap, the operating system kernel cannot be trusted:

  • Since it is launched by an untrusted process.

  • Designers of trusted systems often avoid the problem by including boot components in the TCB.

AEGIS was a secure bootstrap process.

  • Ensuring the integrity of bootstrap code

Approach

It constructs a chain of integrity checks.

  • Beginning at power-on.

  • Continuing until the final transfer of control from the bootstrap process to the operating system.

Integrity checks are hard to circumvent.

  • Match of a computed cryptographic hash value with a stored digital signature associated with each component.

AEGIS secure boot process guaranty

Two mechanisms guarantee the boot process ends up in a secure state.

  • Even in the event of integrity failures outside of a minimal section of trusted code.

  1. No code is executed unless it is either explicitly trusted or its integrity is verified before its use.

  2. Upon an integrity failure, a process can recover a suitable, verified replacement module.

Boot process

Last updated 11 months ago

Whithout AEGIS
Whith AEGIS